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Abstract
Is it always true to say that science is, by definition, universal whilst laws and the courts which apply
them are a classic state and national expression? Yes and no. In recent years a new scenario has
opened all over the world. Courts intervene more and more in disputes on matters related to
scientific procedures in the biological field. In doing so the courts' decisions are affected by scientific
issues and ways of reasoning and, on the other hand, affect the scientific field and its way of
reasoning. While the old matter of bioethics was still alive and while judges were improving their
skill in dealing with hard matters, like refusal of medical treatments, abortion, euthanasia et cetera,
a new challenge appeared on the horizon, the challenge of biological sciences, and especially of the
most troubled field of human genetics. A completely new awareness is developing among judges
that they belong to an international judiciary community, as informal as it is real. Such a community
is, even at an embryonic stage, sufficiently universal to be able to come together with the
international scientific community. The authors maintain we are in urgent need for new interaction
between judges and scientists and of new international means in the light of such cooperation.
Judges and jurists need to become better acquainted with scientific questions and learn to exchange
ideas with scientists. They also need to set themselves against the latters' conceptual systems and
be willing to put their own up for discussion. A European Network for Life Sciences, Health and
the Courts is taking its first steps, and judges and scientists are working side by side to tackle the
new challenges. The provisional headquarters are located at the University of Pavia (I), Laboratorio
di Biologia dello Sviluppo and Collegio Ghislieri (e-mail:. enlsc@unipv.it). ENLSC activity is inspired by
the following idea: to be against science is as much antiscientific as to be acritically pro-science.
Introduction
Is it always true to say that science is, by definition, uni-
versal whilst laws and the courts which apply them are a
classic state and national expression? Yes and no.
In this commentary we point out the new scenario that in
recent years has opened all over the world. Courts inter-
vene more and more in disputes on matters related to sci-
entific procedures in the biological field. In doing so the
courts' decisions are affected by scientific issues and ways
of reasoning and, on the other hand, affect the scientific
field and its way of reasoning. Nowadays science affects
law more and more and vice versa.
We maintain we are in urgent need for new interaction
between judges and scientists and of new international
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means in the light of such cooperation. A European Net-
work for Life Sciences, Health and the Courts is taking its
first steps, and judges and scientists are working side by
side to tackle the new challenges.
Discussion
An unconscious coincidence
Although the intervention of the law in the field of medi-
cine and life sciences is not a novelty, in recent years legal
intervention in old bioethical and new science related mat-
ters has increased dramatically. Court decisions have
become widespread in most countries. Parliamentary acts
have regulated many aspects of women's and men's
choices regarding their own bodies. Codes of conduct
have been enacted in many fields: we may remember, in
the field of experimentation on human beings, the Good
Clinical Practice or the new issues of the Declaration of
Helsinki or the documents by the World Health Organisa-
tion. They all lay down greatly important regulations,
although not in a strictly legal sense. Finally, a new wave
of solemn declarations has sprung up from international
institutions. The European Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine (Oviedo, 1997) is one of these, but not the
only one. Let's remember the UNESCO Genome Declara-
tion (1997) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union passed by the European Council of Nice,
7th–10th December 2000. Significantly the Charter only
puts issues such as personal integrity, informed consent or
cloning in its first articles.
The general picture gives us the view of a great, varied and
widely divided process of recognition and enforcement of
the rights and liberties of women and men in the field of
medicine, genetics and life sciences. The most important
new rights and freedom in bioethics have been recognized
in an ever-changing and troubled environment, character-
ized by the existence at a world level of a number of cen-
tres, institutions, independent authorities, professional
societies and so on, with the judiciary and judge-made law
playing a major role.
For example, if we think of the history of the right of
patient's self-determination, that is the matrix of all liber-
ties rooted in our own bodies, we can see that it was first
enforced in judicial cases and decisions in many coun-
tries. Laws have usually been enacted later and have often
put limits on judicial standards.
Furthermore, in the earlier cases from European countries
or from the US, judges were clearly not aware of each
other. And even in recent years, we cannot be sure if they
have been aware of each other's decisions. However, in
many rulings the fundamental concept of self-determina-
tion is held with surprising similarity of concepts and
adopted legal criteria.
On the other hand in some situations a real problem of
lack of scientific knowledge among judges came to the
fore. Consider, for instance, the case of experimentation
on human beings. In this field there is a sort of continuum
between rules that regulate relations between subjects (a
typical characteristic of those of law) and strictly technical
rules which concern scientific requisites and methods of
carrying out research. This poses great problems of defini-
tion and concept.
The Italian Constitutional Court fell into a scientific pit-
fall handling the well-known Di Bella affair. In the late
Nineties the Italian Dr Di Bella cured many cancer
patients according to a therapy made up by himself. The
Ministry of Health, the Society of Oncologists and the Ital-
ian National Health Service did not consider such a ther-
apy as scientific based. Patients applied to the Italian
National Health Service for the reimbursement of the
expenses for the Di Bella therapy. Hence the question was
whether the National Health Service was right not having
considered such a therapy as scientifically based and hav-
ing refused to bear its costs. The Italian Minister of Health,
set up a scientific committee (chair: Prof. Umberto Vero-
nesi) that prepared a clinical trial on the Di Bella Therapy.
Although the criterion of access for patients was not as
strict, some patients were excluded from the trial. The
Constitutional court said that in doing so the patients'
right to health had been violated and, consequently, the
law was against the Constitution.
The key point is the following: the implicit assumption of
the court was that the right to health can't tolerate the
rationale of clinical trial, that is, in other words, the neces-
sity to select people to be admitted to the trial according
to the scientific hypothesis on which the experimentation
is based. In doing so the court showed a clear lack of
knowledge of how a clinical trial works and of its scientific
assumptions (without selection of the patients it is simply
impossible to speak about a scientific experimentation).
The point is more clear if we consider that, before the
experiment, nobody knows if the risk for health of indi-
viduals is greater for those enrolled in the trial or for those
excluded. It is simply a matter of fact, and the response
depends on the results and the effects of the experiment.
In this light, we should ask how do we consider the right
to health violated. We could consider it violated according
to the chances given by the participation in the experiment
(even if chances in a trial are both negative and positive)
or according to the results of the trial, however we can
know them just at the end of the trial.
Up to a certain point judge-made laws on medicine and
bioethics have followed national paths, developing rules
of judgement linked to specific real-life scenarios. Igno-
rance of foreign languages has led English speaking juristsHealth and Quality of Life Outcomes 2003, 1 http://www.hqlo.com/content/1/1/22
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to disregard the work and experiences of jurists from
France, Germany and other countries, even when han-
dling the same issues or dealing with concepts and criteria
which were not dissimilar. The ignorance of mainland
European jurists has led to exactly the same situation.
These cultural and national barriers have not, however,
prevented the formation of a sort of communis opinio (a
shared set of legal standards) between judges from widely
differing legal systems. It is extraordinary that this has
happened in a way which appears to be largely "uncon-
scious". Judges have identified the rule of the case reason-
ing by principles: a phenomenon in which a number of
themes and ideas become a kind of collective discourse on
both sides of the Common/Civil Law divide or in coun-
tries belonging to totally different traditions such as
Japan. The question of the spread of the patient's right to
self-determination regarding medical treatment and the
diffusion of the legal standard of informed consent is the
most important of all.
The present day's challenge
While the old (may we say so?) matter of bioethics was still
alive and while judges were improving their skill in deal-
ing with hard matters, like refusal of medical treatments,
abortion, euthanasia et cetera, a new challenge appeared
on the horizon. We are thinking of the challenge of bio-
logical sciences, and especially of the most troubled field
of human genetics.
Let's recall some particular cases.
a. Now that our DNA has been decoded and genetic infor-
mation becomes more available, more and more new pri-
vacy issues are at stake. One of the biggest genetic privacy
problems is employment discrimination. Cases of people
fired after employers learned they were at risk from hered-
itary disorders or of people not offered a job because of
their genetic condition having been reviewed. Insurance
coverage is another area of concern. Insurance companies
may increase premiums or deny coverage for those known
to have certain genetic predispositions. Some insurance
companies require genetic testing as a condition of cover-
age. And unfortunately, these examples of genetic discrim-
ination are not isolated incidents [1].
b. In the area of reproductive science, the availability of
more information during pregnancy will have major
repercussions. Suppose a woman considering pregnancy
is tested to determine whether she carries genetic traits
that could harm her child. The test is negative and the
woman becomes pregnant, but the child is born severely
deformed. The laboratory made a mistake. The woman
sues the laboratory, claiming she based her decision to
have a child on the results of the negligent testing. Is the
laboratory liable? Is the answer different if the test, even
when properly done, correctly identifies harmful traits
only 30 percent of the time? What do we do with claims
for "wrongful life?" We will no doubt see more of these
claims as our ability to predict genetic disorders continues
to improve. Unfortunately, there are few standards for this
kind of testing. We need guidance sooner rather than later,
because we are already facing questions that only a few
years ago seemed unimaginable – and we are grappling
for the answers.
c. In other situations the matter was about the property of
sperm of a deceased man and the inheritance rights: is the
sperm an "asset" of the estate and is it, therefore, covered
by the property settlement? Or is it the object of a "unique
form of 'property"' that arose from the man's "fundamen-
tal right to procreate with whom he chooses"? And, if yes,
can it only be distributed as the deceased man had
intended? [1]
d. the case of genetic population studies. Many genetic
population studies are carried out in many parts of the
world and in Europe as well. The most famous case can be
found in Iceland. The central point of the Iceland case is
that of a law which gives a private licence to the total her-
itage of medical and genetic data of the entire Icelandic
people, past (from when the data first became available),
present and future. The problem is whether a resource of
this kind, non-repeatable and non-renewable, can be con-
sidered a resource of the state, of its representative institu-
tions, of the nation or of the individual citizens. Who, of
all these, has the power to dispose of this resource? The
elective assemblies, moreover deciding by majority, do
certainly not have unlimited powers. No theory of politi-
cal representation includes the possibility of granting, for
profit making purposes, goods of such a personal nature
of the entire population [2].
e. the case of shared genetic data. The situation is clearly
outlined in the European Union Recommendation
1997(5). Point 58 of the Memorandum to the Recommen-
dation deals with the problem in a very original way:
"The collection and processing of genetic data involves
the storage of data concerning third parties. These third
parties may be constituted by members of the data sub-
ject's genetic line or collateral relatives or members of his/
her social family. The drafters agreed to accord an interme-
diate status to members of the data subject's genetic line
so as to distinguish them from third parties in the strict
sense of the term and to grant them a hybrid legal protec-
tion."
However, we have to stress that nobody, not even the
European Recommendation, defines the concept of inter-Health and Quality of Life Outcomes 2003, 1 http://www.hqlo.com/content/1/1/22
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mediate status and of hybrid legal protection. As a con-
sequence both criteria, according to which such a hybrid
should be defined, and the way of managing the conflicts
among  third parties having an intermediate status are
completely unclear.
In conclusion, in all the situations under points a.-e., and
others like these, the problem is as follows: how should
legal and scientific categories interact with each other?
What is the meaning of such an interaction in which
judges and scientists are parties? How could they have a
proper dialogue? What is the institution or the site in
which such a dialogue should properly take place?
The peculiarity of the new challenge, the scientific 
challenge
Some aspects of the new challenge are common or similar
to those of the old bioethical field. Both in bioethical cases
and in science-law cases, judges have to face and to man-
age with disciplines and fields which are different from
the law: morals, philosophy or life sciences.
Other aspects are quite different and new. There are great
problems of definition and concept along the complex
crest of relations between legal and scientific rule making.
Traditional legal concepts are seriously challenged. We are
thinking of the concept of individual, person, responsibil-
ity/liability, political representation or, simply, of judicial
proceeding, when judges have to get scientific knowledge
in the biotechnology's super-heated political and eco-
nomic environment.
Let's go back to the genetic data that are shared among the
members of the same genetic line. The concept of individ-
ual is seriously questioned: if everybody shares a part of its
genetic dowry with the members of the same genetic line
or collateral relatives may we continue saying that every-
body has his own genetic dowry? Of course if we affirmed
that the simple fact of sharing data gives each "share-
holder" the right of disposal of data of the other "share-
holders", we would end up denying any genetic privacy.
However we have to give a response to the members of a
genetic line who need to know more about the genetic
data of other members for health reasons.
That's the reason why the Italian Privacy Authority (1999)
authorized a hospital to disclose the father's data (against
his will) to his daughter who had to decide whether to
have children or not [3]. In other situations there is a ten-
sion between a physician's duty of confidentiality to the
patient and a duty of disclosure to others who may have a
medical need to know genetic information about the
patient. In 1996, one New Jersey court took its turn at pro-
viding answers in a case involving a woman who had
colon cancer that spread through her body. When she
looked at the medical records of her late father, she dis-
covered he had died from the same hereditary condition.
She sued her father's physician for failing to warn her of
her predisposition to the condition. The New Jersey court
[Safer v. Estate of Pack (1996 N.J.Sup.Ct., App. Div.)]
found that physicians do have a duty to warn individuals
known to be at risk of avoidable harm from a genetic con-
dition [1].
Judges have not found the response to such or similar
problems in existing (written or unwritten) laws. But they
had to give their decision. Hence they have identified the
rule of the case reasoning by principles. Recourse to princi-
ples in order to identify the rule of the concrete case has
odd effects. If the principle invoked is of a very high and
general level, such as that of personal integrity or personal
liberty, the judge carries out an operation the result of
which may also be taken up in other legal systems, pro-
vided there are three conditions: the case to be decided
poses the same problem, there are no specific rules regu-
lating it and, finally, the legal system recognises the same
general principle. This type of decision, given the lack of
local sources of law, has a rate of comparability clearly
higher than those on subjects regulated by specific rules.
Therefore, a judge, directly or not, makes sometimes
recourse to a rule of judgement used in a previous case by
a judge from another legal system.
Many sources of law are supranational and therefore
apply in different countries. Consequently, judge-made
law, fruit of the recourse to general principles and of the
search for the rule of the case starting from stratified and
heterogeneous supranational rules, appears, in part, to be
positioned directly beyond the state dimension. A judge-
made law constructed in this way seems, therefore, to sep-
arate itself not only from the written law of that state but
also of the context of the territory and the legal system in
which the judges are working, a context which, even in the
most open and premonitory theorizations, has not been
questioned.
Faced with all this, the Common Law model may be
evoked above all to mark the distance between the ways in
which the law on life sciences questions are created and
evolve and the traditional concepts of Civil Law. But the
reference to the Common Law, if taken literally, is concep-
tually and historically misleading. The Common Law sys-
tems are rooted more in history and experience than in
general and abstract rationality. As Oliver Wender Holmes
stated in his historic work "The Common Law:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experi-
ence. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral
and political theories, intuition of public policy, avowed
or unconscious, even the prejudice which judges shareHealth and Quality of Life Outcomes 2003, 1 http://www.hqlo.com/content/1/1/22
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with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do
than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men
should be governed [4].
The essential characteristics of Common Laws are a histor-
ical continuity within which the judicial creation of rules
is positioned and has a distinct local rooting. On the con-
trary, the judge-made law we are dealing with here does
not often have any precedent to refer to, nor even a solid
historical bed on which to base itself. It has not a local
dimension, so much so that sometimes judges make
recourse to precedent from other countries. As a conse-
quence, each national judge-made law can be understood
only as a part of a wider (in some respects, universal) judi-
cial attitude towards the rights of citizens and people on
their own bodies and lives.
In short, if the conceptual order which we are suggesting
is closer to Common Law than to Civil Law, it needs to be
clear that we are speaking of a universal Common Law
whose roots and ways of working still have to be under-
stood and constructed. It may be more correct to speak of
a universal judge-made law, which is a more neutral and
descriptive expression of a reality which is calling us to a
great work of rigour and imagination. The judge-made
law we are dealing with is, therefore, first a transnational
law.
A new (coincidental) horizon for law and science
Many signs tell us that a set of first level rights is being cre-
ated on a world level. They regard the person and his/her
own body and life. On the one hand, they concern the
individual for the mere fact of existing in his/her corporeal
and biological dimension. On the other, they lay down
conditions for access to the society (pactum societatis).
In this process transnational judge-made law has a prime,
albeit not exclusive, role which faces, at a constitutional
level, conflicts which were hitherto unheard of or were
dealt with in a different manner, especially as moral prob-
lems. One of the many examples is that of the Italian Con-
stitutional Court when it spoke of the freedom to dispose
of one's own body as a postulate freedom of the person.
Or the statement (in the international debate) whereby a
process of "constitutionalising death" is underway, or
even, of recognising the "due process of dying", in a lan-
guage of public freedom.
On the other hand a completely new awareness is devel-
oping among judges that they belong to an international
judiciary community, as informal as it is real. The judges
have different powers according to the regulations of indi-
vidual states. However, when they have to tackle the ques-
tion of scientific applications in the biological field they
discover that state legislation does not provide adequate
solutions and that it is often necessary to make recourse to
law sources which transcend their respective legislatures.
The community operates, above all, through the exchange
of judicial standards, knowledge and experiences, direct
and informal contacts as well as those of international
meetings in which judges and scientists debate side by
side starting with the problems and not from the differ-
ences in national laws [5].
Such a community is, even at an embryonic stage, suffi-
ciently universal to be able to come together with the
international scientific community. And this is a real
novelty. In this sense we could say that it is not true any-
more that science is, by definition, universal whilst laws
and the courts are a typical state and national expression.
In this perspective the interaction between the world of
law and the world of science is, and will be ever more so,
essential for developing our work. Of course, universality
of science and universality of law are different under some
respects. We tolerate a certain amount of relative differ-
ence in the world of law, because of differences in societal
values and differences in viewpoints even on the basis of
shared values.
Conclusions
what should we do?
We've seen that in most cases judges have held important
and innovative principles, but often without being aware
of what other judges, in other countries, had decided in
similar cases. This means that our first duty is to increase
the consciousness of judges as to how common their
problems are and how often their rulings are similar to
each other's. In other words, judges should be more aware
they are playing a role of great importance in the enforce-
ment of new rights and freedom regarding the human and
they should be aware of the great responsibility they are
entrusted with. Judges should be more aware both of the
universal context in which their decisions are embedded
and of their contribution to that kind of communis opinio
totius orbis (a universal shared set of legal standards)
which has already begun to form on the basis of questions
posed by life sciences.
Judges and jurists need to become better acquainted with
scientific questions and learn to exchange ideas with sci-
entists. They also need to set themselves against the latters'
conceptual systems and be willing to put their own up for
discussion. These results may be achieved through the cre-
ation of occasions and places for international meetings
involving judges and jurists, interested in issues of law-sci-
ence, and scientists.
In this perspective a European Network for Life Sciences,
Health and the Courts (ENLSC) is taking its first steps. It
has, although operating in Europe, a worldwide perspec-Publish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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tive and regards as a task of priority the co-operation with
similar organizations all over the world. It continues the
activity of study and judicial education which had rele-
vant occasions in the International Meeting Bioethical
Matters and the Courts: Do Judges Make Law? (Milan 2001)
[6], the participation of European judges and scientists in
the 1st and 2nd International Working Conversation (Kona
2001 and Ottawa 2002: see the web site http://www.ein
shac.org/), the International Conference Juridical and Psy-
chosocial Implications of Human Genetics (Rome 2002), the
I Residential Course for Judges on Present Biological Problems
and Judicial Implications (Pavia 2002) [7] and the Interna-
tional conference Bioethics and Judges (Lausanne 2003).
A promoting group of such a European Network is cur-
rently operating. The next meeting (with the participation
of judges and scientists from European countries and
invited colleagues from US, Australia, Canada and Africa)
is planned for June 3rd – 4th, 2003 in Pavia (to receive the
ENLSC letter or to get in touch with the Promoting Group
e-mail:. enlsc@unipv.it). The provisional headquarters
are located at the University of Pavia (I), Laboratorio di Bio-
logia dello Sviluppo and Collegio Ghislieri, which have given
their initial support.
ENLSC foresees that in the next few decades the issues
related to science and the law will reasonably increase,
both in frequency and importance. It consequently aims,
on one hand, to offer European judges and Courts occa-
sions of contacts and the most relevant and critical infor-
mation in the field of life sciences and health and, on the
other hand, to offer scientists the opportunity to under-
stand and debate the legal and social framework in which
they operate. Furthermore, ENLSC aims to promote both
among judges and scientists a better knowledge of how
science affects the law, and vice versa, and to increase the
awareness about reasoning and assumptions in the fields
of science and the law.
The main activities of the European Network are as fol-
lows:
• in cooperation with institutions dedicated to judicial
education, with universities and research centres, to
organise courses and seminars in order to respond to the
growing learning needs of the European judges in science-
law matters;
• To facilitate access of the Courts to the scientific infor-
mation that is necessary to deal with the cases that they
will be confronted with increasingly.
• To create opportunities in which the worlds of the life
sciences and the law (both universities and judges) can
work together. In doing so they can tackle the extremely
difficult problems arising from the interaction between
the categories of the law and those of science.
In short, ENLSC activity is inspired by the following idea:
to be against science is as much antiscientific as to be acrit-
ically pro-science.
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